White Collar Crime in 2026: Key Trends in Enforcement and Corporate Liability

Introduction: 2026 Enforcement Landscape

2026 kicks off with a dynamic white-collar landscape in the UK. Despite Nick Ephgrave’s early departure as Director of the Serious Fraud Office (“SFO”) there are early but meaningful signs that the SFO’s approach to enforcement one year into its five-year strategic plan (2024–2029),¹ is changing in both pace and posture.

In particular:

• The SFO’s strategy prioritises faster case progression, earlier use of investigatory tools such as dawn raids, greater deployment of technology-enabled investigations, and strengthened intelligence-sharing both domestically and internationally. Recent activity suggests that these priorities are starting to translate into operational outcomes, including higher profile charging decisions (Glencore and Store First), more assertive use of ancillary powers (first Unexplained Wealth Order (“UWO”)) and an increased willingness to intervene at earlier stages of suspected criminality.
• The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 (“ECCTA”) has reshaped the legal framework for corporate liability, including in respect of the long-anticipated “failure to prevent fraud” offence, the expansion of corporate criminal liability, and the enhanced pre-investigatory powers for the SFO under section 2A of the Criminal Justice Act 1987.² These reforms increase the investigative and enforcement tools at prosecutors’ disposal.
• The Government has also launched its UK Anti-Corruption Strategy 2025 (the “Anti-Corruption Strategy”), which sets out a renewed commitment to strengthen enforcement against corruption, support industry in preventing and detecting corrupt activity, and address systemic vulnerabilities in sectors exposed to economic crime.³ Priority commitments include protecting institutions, implementing economic crime-related SLAPPs measures under ECCTA, and increasing transparency around beneficial ownership, including Crown Dependencies and overseas entities.⁴ This further positions corruption and economic crime as national security and economic resilience issues, signalling sustained political backing for proactive enforcement by agencies such as the SFO, National Crime Agency (“NCA”) and Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”).

Against this backdrop, we expect that businesses will face a more demanding enforcement climate in 2026, characterised by broader corporate liability, increased cross-border cooperation, heightened sanctions risk and growing exposure to technology-enabled crime.

In this article, we expand on the key trends in enforcement and corporate liability that all clients should be alive to in 2026.

1. Corporate Criminal Liability and the Failure to Prevent Fraud

A step-change in corporate exposure

The introduction of the failure to prevent fraud (“FTPF”) offence under ECCTA (effective 1 September 2025) marks a fundamental shift in the UK’s corporate criminal liability regime. The offence applies to large organisations, regardless of sector, where an “associated person” commits a fraud offence with intent to benefit the “relevant body” (a large organisation satisfying at least two of the following criteria: turnover over £36m, a balance sheet more than £18m or over 250 employees), unless the body can demonstrate that it had reasonable fraud prevention procedures in place.⁵ It covers a wide range of financial offences under various acts, including false accounting (Theft Act 1968), fraudulent trading (Companies Act 2006) and many Fraud Act offences.

ECCTA also significantly reforms the doctrine of corporate criminal liability, lowering the evidential threshold for attributing criminal liability to organisations. This moves away from the historically restrictive “directing mind and will” test (established in Tesco v Nattrass⁶) and brings the UK closer to models seen in other jurisdictions (like the US, at least as far as economic crimes are concerned). Prosecutors are already looking into possible offences, and investigations and charges are expected to filter through this year.

This strategy complements the existing enforcement tools under the Bribery Act 2010, instrumental in promoting fair business practices with its broad jurisdictional reach, and which has already secured dozens of prosecutions and convictions.⁷

Litigation risk and “reasonable procedures”

As with the Bribery Act’s failure to prevent bribery offence, the practical FTPF battleground will be what constitutes “reasonable procedures”. While government guidance provides a principles-based framework, enforcement action and litigation are likely to determine how regulators and courts assess the adequacy of fraud prevention measures in practice.⁸

Recent SFO charging decisions underline that the adequacy of corporate compliance programmes is likely to become an increasingly contested issue in litigation. In April 2025, the SFO charged United Insurance Brokers Limited with offences under the Bribery Act 2010, alleging a failure to prevent a US-based intermediary from making corrupt payments to secure reinsurance contracts in Ecuador. If the case proceeds to trial, it is expected to be the first assessment of “adequate procedures” to prevent bribery. It is also likely to be instructive regarding how the FTPF offence will be interpreted, particularly in relation to third-party oversight, documentation and the evidential standard required to establish “reasonable procedures”.

Considering the above, we expect 2026 to bring increased scrutiny of:

• Board-level ownership of fraud risk;
• Documented risk assessments and controls;
• Evidence of staff training and compliance culture; and
• Monitoring, audit trails and data-driven oversight.

For many organisations, this will translate into a need not only to enhance controls, but to ensure that those controls are provable, contemporaneous and well-documented, particularly where Deferred Prosecution Agreements (“DPAs”) or charging decisions may turn on compliance evidence.

2. Regulatory and Enforcement Trends: A More Assertive SFO

Faster cases and earlier intervention

The SFO’s 2025–26 Business Plan commits to increasing the pace of investigations. In the 15 months preceding the publication of the Business Plan, the SFO had already brought charges in the first case opened since Nick Ephgrave became Director, created capacity to open eight new investigations, and had five cases listed for trial in 2026 (including high-profile trials in 2026 involving Petrofac, Patisserie Valerie, and Buy2Let Cars).⁹ The SFO has already taken advantage of its expanded capacity by commencing a new £300m fraud and bribery investigation into (and making arrests at) a UK listed social housing company, Home REIT.¹⁰ This emphasis on speed has been accompanied by an increased willingness to deploy dawn raids and compulsory powers earlier in the investigative lifecycle, reflecting the Director’s stated objective of reducing lengthy pre-charge timelines.

The SFO has also diversified its toolkit. The first successful use by the SFO of a UWO in 2025 in relation to £1.1 million of assets is a notable development, signalling a greater appetite to use civil recovery and asset-focused powers alongside traditional criminal prosecutions.¹¹

This priority is echoed in the Anti-Corruption Strategy, which includes a specific commitment to speed up the SFO’s investigations through more efficient investigative processes and the increased use of artificial intelligence and machine learning.¹²

The strategy also commits the SFO to sharing lessons learned from its use of technology across the wider enforcement system, suggesting a more coordinated, data-driven approach to economic crime investigations in the years ahead.

Driving Enforcement in Complex Corporate and Investment Fraud

Recent cases illustrate the SFO’s determination to advance complex and long-running investigations. Further action connected to Glencore – including charges against six former employees in relation to alleged corrupt payments benefiting oil operations in West Africa¹³ -highlights the agency’s ongoing focus on large-scale international bribery and corruption cases. Similarly, the pursuit of cases such as Store First -where multiple defendants were charged in a complex pension fraud tied to investments into storage units¹⁴ – reflects a continued commitment to prosecuting high-value investment fraud matters that span many years and involve extensive investigative and disclosure challenges. These developments underscore the SFO’s readiness to bring difficult and resource-intensive investigations to charge and, ultimately, to court.

Expanded pre-investigatory powers

Under section 211 ECCTA, the SFO’s section 2A powers-which allow the compulsory production of documents before a formal investigation is opened-have been extended beyond bribery and corruption to a broader range of economic crimes.¹⁵ This represents another significant shift, enabling the SFO to gather evidence earlier and apply pressure before organisations may even be aware that they are under scrutiny.

For businesses, this raises the stakes around document retention, data governance and early legal assessment when regulators make contact.

Cross-border cooperation and overseas evidence

International cooperation remains a cornerstone of the SFO’s strategy. The agency has signalled increased reliance on Criminal Overseas Production Orders (“COPOs”) to obtain electronic data held overseas, reducing dependence on slower mutual legal assistance processes.¹⁶ This reflects the reality that many fraud and corruption cases now involve multinational data sources, cloud-based systems and cross-border financial flows.

The wider enforcement ecosystem

Alongside the SFO, other agencies continue to play a significant role. The NCA remains central to tackling serious organised crime, money laundering and asset recovery, while the FCA has refined its enforcement approach to focus on faster outcomes and supervisory intervention.¹⁷ Multi-agency collaboration is increasingly the norm, rather than the exception.

The FCA has also recently prioritised insider dealing cases such as that of Redinel Korfuzi, a former hedge fund analyst, and his sister. In July 2025, they were convicted of insider dealing and money laundering charges following allegations brought by the FCA that they traded off confidential information to illegally earn nearly £1 million.¹⁸ OFSI has recently proposed significantly enhancing its fining powers.

3. Sanctions, Geopolitics and Corporate Risk

Sanctions enforcement as a corporate risk issue

Sanctions enforcement remains a priority area, driven by geopolitical instability and the continued expansion of UK sanctions regimes. Government reporting highlights sustained enforcement activity by the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI), including monetary penalties and compliance investigations.¹⁹

For corporates, sanctions risk is no longer confined to financial institutions. Supply chains, trade finance, joint ventures and third-party relationships are all under scrutiny, with enforcement increasingly focused on circumvention and indirect breaches.

The Anti-Corruption Strategy signals a forthcoming review of the UK’s legislative and enforcement response to kleptocracy, including the use of sanctions and asset recovery tools, with a view to strengthening the UK’s ability to disrupt corrupt financial flows.²⁰

This review may result in further legislative or operational changes, increasing sanctions-related exposure for corporates with complex ownership structures, overseas investments or politically exposed counterparties.

Indirect and secondary exposure

Although the UK does not operate US-style secondary sanctions to the same extent, businesses face growing exposure where they facilitate, enable or fail to detect sanctioned activity through intermediaries. This raises complex issues around due diligence, contractual controls and ongoing monitoring, particularly for organisations operating in higher-risk jurisdictions.

Challenges to sanctions designations

In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Britain has sanctioned more than 1,800 individuals and corporate entities. There has also been an increase in legal challenges to sanctions designations, with courts scrutinising proportionality and procedural fairness.²¹

While some have succeeded in having their listings overturned through administrative processes, the courts have generally shown deference to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, accepting its justifications for imposing sanctions. While outcomes remain fact-specific, these cases are shaping how sanctions powers are interpreted and applied, and may influence future enforcement approaches.

4. Technology-Driven and Emerging Crime Risks

AI-enabled fraud and cyber-enabled crime

Technological innovation continues to drive new forms of economic crime. Regulators and prosecutors are increasingly focused on AI-enabled fraud, including deepfakes, synthetic identities and automated manipulation of compliance systems. These risks are compounded by remote working models and reliance on digital onboarding and verification processes.

The SFO has acknowledged the importance of advanced data analytics and digital forensics in tackling these threats, with investment in technology forming a core part of its strategic plan.²²

Crypto, Decentralised Finance (“DeFi”) and asset tracing

Crypto-assets and DeFi continue to present challenges for enforcement agencies, particularly in relation to money laundering and asset recovery. However, recent prosecutions demonstrate increasing law enforcement sophistication in tracing and evidencing the movement of digital assets. Notably, the successful prosecution of the so-called “UK crypto queen” for laundering the proceeds of cryptocurrency fraud illustrates the growing ability of investigators and prosecutors to follow complex cryptoasset trails through multiple wallets and exchanges.²³

While legislative frameworks continue to evolve, regulators are increasingly adept at tracing digital assets, raising enforcement and compliance expectations for businesses operating in or adjacent to these markets.

ESG-related enforcement and litigation

Environmental, social and governance risks are also moving into sharper focus. Allegations of greenwashing, forced labour misrepresentation and environmental crime have and continue to attract regulatory scrutiny from bodies such as the FCA, Competition and Markets Authority and advertising regulators,²⁴ alongside an increase in private litigation. We expect cross-border enforcement in this area to grow.

5. Internal Investigations and Whistleblowing

Internal investigations remain a critical component of corporate risk management. The SFO has publicly indicated that it is considering greater incentivisation of (a) self-reporting²⁵ and (b) whistleblowers (including potentially financial rewards), signalling a potential cultural shift in the UK enforcement environment.²⁶

This development, combined with expanded investigatory powers and greater expectations around self-reporting, places renewed emphasis on:

• Investigation independence and quality;
• Preservation of privilege; and
• Transparent remediation and governance reforms.

Organisations that can demonstrate a credible response to allegations—including effective whistleblowing frameworks—are likely to be better positioned when engaging with regulators.

6. Looking Ahead: Practical Implications for 2026

While it is too early to assess the effectiveness of the SFO’s reforms, early indicators suggest greater enforcement activity and more visible use of powers. The combination of expanded corporate liability, faster investigations and enhanced cross-border cooperation presents a materially different risk environment for businesses.

For boards and senior management, the key themes for 2026 are clear:

• Corporate criminal risk is broader and regulators have more tools at their disposal;
• Governance, documentation and culture matter more than ever; and
• Early preparedness for investigations, sanctions exposure and technology-driven risk is essential.

For clients, this points to a regulatory environment in which transparency, governance and the ability to respond quickly to enforcement action will be critical differentiators.

The organisations best placed to navigate 2026 will be those that treat white collar risk as a strategic board-level issue, rather than a reactive compliance exercise.

 

 

¹ Serious Fraud Office, “SFO sets out next steps in ambitious five-year plan” (April 2024); Serious Fraud Office, Business Plan 2025–26 (2025): https://www.gov.uk/government/news/serious-fraud-office-sets-out-next-steps-in-ambitious-plan.

²Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023; Home Office, “New measures to tackle fraud come into effect” (September 2025): https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-measures-to-tackle-fraud-come-into-effect

³ HM Government, UK Anti-Corruption Strategy 2023–2028 (Home Office / JACU), pp 8-9: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-anti-corruption-strategy-2025

⁴ HM Government, UK Anti-Corruption Strategy 2023–2028 (Home Office / JACU), paras 56 and 64.

⁵  Home Office, “New failure to prevent fraud guidance published” (2025): https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-failure-to-prevent-fraud-guidance-published

⁶ Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] A.C. 153

⁷ HM Government, UK Anti-Corruption Strategy 2023–2028 (Home Office / JACU), para 22.

⁸ Ministry of Justice, “Guidance to organisations on reasonable fraud prevention procedures” (2025); comparison with Ministry of Justice, Bribery Act 2010 Guidance: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/bribery-act-2010-guidance

⁹ Serious Fraud Office, “SFO sets out next steps in ambitious five-year plan” (April 2024); Serious Fraud Office, Business Plan 2025–26 (2025) performance metrics and operational priorities: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/serious-fraud-office-sets-out-next-steps-in-ambitious-plan.

¹⁰ Serious Fraud Office, “SFO announces investigation in social housing sector” (January 2026): https://www.gov.uk/government/news/sfo-announces-investigation-in-social-housing-sector.

¹¹ Serious Fraud Office, “SFO secures £1.1 million with first Unexplained Wealth Order” (September 2025) https://www.gov.uk/government/news/sfo-secures-11-million-with-first-unexplained-wealth-order

¹² HM Government, UK Anti-Corruption Strategy 2023–2028 (Home Office / JACU), paras 42.

¹³ Serious Fraud Office, Glencore employees (2025): https://www.gov.uk/sfo-cases/glencore-employees

¹⁴ Serious Fraud Office, SFO charges six in complex pension fraud investigation (2025): https://www.gov.uk/government/news/sfo-charges-six-in-complex-pension-fraud-investigation

¹⁵ Criminal Justice Act 1987, s.2A (as amended by section 211 ECCTA 2023).

¹⁶ Serious Fraud Office, Five-Year Strategy 2024–2029: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/serious-fraud-office-strategy-2024-29

¹⁷ Financial Conduct Authority, Enforcement Annual Performance Report 2023/24; National Crime Agency, Annual Report and Accounts 2024–25: https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/annual-reports/annual-report-2024-2025; https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-crime-agency-annual-report-and-accounts-2024-to-2025

¹⁸ R v Redinel Korfuzi and Oerta Korfuz [2025] EWCC 22.

¹⁹ HM Treasury / OFSI, OFSI Annual Review 2024–25; UK Government, Economic Crime Plan 2 – Progress Report, pp 8 and 20: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ofsi-annual-review-2024-25-effective-sanctions

²⁰HM Government, UK Anti-Corruption Strategy 2023–2028 (Home Office / JACU), para 59.

²¹ Shvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs; Dalston Projects Ltd and others v Secretary of State for Transport [2025] UKSC 30.

²² Serious Fraud Office, Five-Year Strategy 2024–2029 (technology and data analytics commitments, page 8): https://www.gov.uk/government/news/serious-fraud-office-strategy-2024-29

²³ R v Zhimin Qian & Seng Hok Ling [2025].

²⁴ For example, the CMA’s investigation into ASOS, Boohoo and George at Asda concerning allegedly misleading “eco”, “sustainable” and “responsible” fashion claims (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/green-claims-cma-secures-landmark-changes-from-asos-boohoo-and-asda); the ASA’s investigation into adverts by HSBC, Wessex Water, Intrepid Travel and Easigrass concerning misleading green credentials or environmental impact (https://www.asa.org.uk/rulings/hsbc-uk-bank-plc-g21-1127656-hsbc-uk-bank-plc.html; https://www.asa.org.uk/rulings/wessex-water-services-ltd-a24-1236471-wessex-water-services-ltd.html; https://www.asa.org.uk/rulings/intrepid-travel-group-uk-ltd-a22-1173927-intrepid-travel-group-uk-ltd.html; https://www.asa.org.uk/rulings/easigrass–distribution–ltd-g23-1215528-easigrass–distribution–ltd.html).

²⁵ As we explain in further detail here: https://pallasllp.com/journal/sfo-new-corporate-crime-policy-seeks-to-incentivise-self-reporting.

²⁶ Serious Fraud Office, Business Plan 2025–26, pp 2 and 7: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/serious-fraud-office-sets-out-next-steps-in-ambitious-plan.